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Experience shows that it is when such general interests are duly taken into account, and are made to prevail, by States as well as by other subjects of International Law, that this latter has progressed. It could hardly be denied that the advances of International Law in the last decades have been achieved when the general, superior interests of humankind have been properly acknowledged and given expression to (such as, e.g., in International Human Rights Law, in International Environmental Law, in the Law of the Sea, in the Law of Outer Space). States themselves have contributed to those advances, whenever they have placed basic considerations of humanity and the general interests of the international community as a whole above their own individual interests.
In this connection, the ultimate aim of jus cogens is precisely that of securing the prevalence of the interests and most fundamental values of the interna-tional community as a whole.
2 Th e absolute prohibitions of grave violations of human rights indicate, for example, as recalled by M. Lachs, how "mankind, or the international community, on its journey through history, found it necessary to outlaw once and for all certain actions (...). On this, the deniers and doubters have to agree, if they accept the basic premises of law and the imperative of its progress".
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Th ere are, in fact, international obligations pertaining to the safeguard of fundamental values of the international community itself, which are distinct from other international obligations; hence the emergence of concepts such as that of obligations erga omnes, ensuing from jus cogens, in contemporary International Law.
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Th e examination of humankind as a subject of International Law does not exhaust itself in the identifi cation and assertion of its common and superior interests. It calls for the consideration of the fundamental principle of humanity and the basic considerations of humanity which nowadays mark presence in the whole corpus juris of International Law 5 (with a conceptual precision), of the legal consequences of the emergence of humankind as a subject of International Law, of the relevance of the human rights framework, and, last but not least, of the question of humankind's capacity to act and its legal representation.
II. The Fundamental Principle of Humanity
Th e treatment dispensed to human beings, in any circumstances, ought to abide by the principle of humanity, which permeates the whole corpus juris of International Law in general, and International Humanitarian Law in particular, conventional as well as customary. Acts which, -under certain international treaties or conventions, -were regarded as amounting to genocide, or as grave violations of International Humanitarian Law, were already prohibited even before the en- try into force of such treaties or conventions, by general international law. One may here invoke, in the framework of this latter, e.g., the universal recognition of the aforementioned principle of humanity. 6 In the perennial lesson of a learned jusphilosopher, "if not the laws themselves, at least their content was already in force" before the perpetration of the atrocities of the XXth century, in distinct latitudes; in other words, added G. Radbruch, "those laws respond, by their content, to a Law superior to the laws (...). Whereby we see how, by the turn of a century of legal positivism, that old idea of a Law superior to the laws is reborn (...). Th e way to reach the settlement of these problems is already implicit in the name that the philosophy of Law used to have in the old Universities and which, after many years of not being used, comes to reemerge today: in the name and in the concept of natural law".
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It is not to pass unnoticed that the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda [ICTR] rightly pondered, in the case of J.-P. Akayesu (Judgment of 02.09.1998), that the concept of crimes against humanity had already been recognized well before the Nuremberg Tribunal itself (1945) (1946) . Th e Martens clause contributed to that eff ect (cf. infra); in fact, expressions similar to that of those crimes, invoking victimized humanity, appeared much earlier in human history.
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Th e same ICTR pointed out, in the case J. Kambanda (Judgment of 04.09.1998), that in all periods of human history genocide has infl icted great losses to humankind, the victims being not only the persons slaughtered but humanity itself (in acts of genocide as well as in crimes against humanity).
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It can hardly be doubted the content of the condemnation of grave violations of human rights, of acts of genocide, of crimes against humanity, and of other atrocities, was already engraved in human conscience, well before their tipifi cation or codifi cation at international level, be it in the 1948 Convention against Genocide, or in other treaties of human rights or of International Humanitarian Law. Nowadays, international crimes are condemned by general as well as conventional International Law. Th is development has been fostered by 6 In this respect, it has already been pointed out that "it is increasingly believed that the role of International Law is to ensure a minimum of guarantees and of humanity for all, whether in time of peace or in time of war"; J. Contemporary (conventional and general) international law has been characterized to a large extent by the emergence and evolution of its peremptory norms (the jus cogens), and a greater consciousness, in a virtually universal scale, of the principle of humanity.
11 Grave violations of human rights, acts of genocide, crimes against humanity, among other atrocities, are in breach of absolute prohibitions of jus cogens.
12 Th e feeling of humaneness -proper of a new jus gentium, of the XXIst century, -comes to permeate the whole corpus juris of contemporary International Law. 14 In its jurisprudence constante, the IACtHR, in interpreting and applying the American Convention on Human Rights, has consistently invoked the general principles of law.
15 Th e same has done the European Court of Human Rights [ECtHR], in its interpretation and Humankind as a Subject of International Law application of the European Convention on Human Rights.
16 Among such principles, those endowed with a truly fundamental character form the substratum of the legal order itself, disclosing the right to the Law of which are titulaires all human beings. 17 In the domain of the International Law of Human Rights, the fundamental principles of the dignity of the human person and of the inalienability of the rights which are inherent to her fall under this category. In its Advisory Opinion n. 18, on the Juridical Condition of Undocumented Migrants (2003), the IACtHR expressly referred to both principles.
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Th e prevalence of the principle of respect of the dignity of the human person is identifi ed with the ultimate aim itself of Law, of the legal order, both national and international. By virtue of this fundamental principle, every person ought to be respected (in her honour and in her beliefs) by the simple fact of belonging to humankind, irrespective of any circumstance.
19 Th e principle of the inalienability of the rights inherent to the human being, in its turn, is identifi ed with a basic assumption of the construction of the whole corpus juris of the International Law of Human Rights. As to the principles of International Humanitarian Law, it has been convincingly argued that one should consider Humanitarian Law treaties as a whole as constituting the expression -and the development -of such general principles, applicable in any circumstances, so as to secure a better protection to those victimized. Human Rights take as a "starting point" their common concern to safeguard human dignity, which forms the basis of their minimum standards of humanity.
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In fact, the principle of humanity can be understood in distinct ways. Firstly, it can be conceived as a principle underlying the prohibition of inhuman treatment, established by Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. Secondly, the principle referred to can be invoked by reference to humankind as 16 a whole, in relation to matters of common, general and direct interest to it. And thirdly, the same principle can be employed to qualify a given quality of human behaviour (humaneness).
In the Celebici case (Judgment of 16.11.1998), the aforementioned ICTFY (Trial Chamber) qualifi ed as inhuman treatment an intentional or deliberate act or omission which causes serious suff ering (or mental or physical damage), or constitutes a serious attack on human dignity; thus, the Tribunal added, "inhuman treatment is intentional treatment which does not conform with the fundamental principle of humanity, and forms the umbrella under which the remainder of the listed 'grave breaches' in the Conventions fall". 23 Reference has already been made to the relevance of the Martens clause, 24 which can here be reasserted.
III. Humankind and Considerations of Humanity: A Conceptual Precision
From the preceding considerations it can be promptly perceived that distinct meanings have been attributed to the term "humanity" in contemporary International Law, such as those found in the jurisprudential construction of the ad hoc ICTFY and the ICTR (supra). Th is construction is clear in associating "humanity" with the universal principle of respect for the dignity of the human person, or the sense of humaneness. Th e ECtHR and the IACtHR have expressed the same concern by extensively resorting to general principles of law in their converging jurisprudence constante. Th e ICJ has likewise resorted to "elementary considerations of humanity", in a similar line of thinking.
25 Th e sense of humaneness and the concern with the needed respect for human dignity have thus marked their presence in the case-law of contemporary international tribunals.
When one comes, however, to consider the expansion of international legal personality, that is, the emergence of new subjects of today's universal International Law, a conceptual precision is here rendered necessary. Th e expanded International Law of our days encompasses, as its subjects, apart from the States, also international organizations, and human beings, either individually or collectively, -disclosing a basic feature of what I see it fi t to denominate the historical process of humanization of International Law. In the framework of this latter 22 and in addition to those subjects, humankind has in my view also emerged as a subject of International Law. Th e term "humankind" appears not as a synonym of "humanity" (supra), but endowed with a distinct and very concrete meaning: humankind encompasses all the members of the human species as a whole (including, in a temporal dimension, 26 present as well as future generations). In fact, there is nowadays a growing body of international instruments (treaties, declaratory and other resolutions, among others) containing express references to "mankind" or "humankind", and attributing rights to it. Th ere are nowadays some conceptual constructions in course to give concrete expression, with juridical consequences, to rights attributed to humankind. 27 It is likely that this conceptual development will intensify in the years to come. Up to the present, all this results from the aforementioned growing perception and awareness of common and superior interests, and of fundamental values shared by the international community as a whole.
IV. The Emergence of Humankind as a Subject of International Law
Along the evolution of contemporary International Law, the international legal personality, as already pointed out, became no longer the monopoly of the States. Th ese latter, as well as international organizations and human beings (taken individually and collectively) became titulaires of rights and bearers of duties emanating directly from International Law.
28 And humankind has gradually come also to appear as a subject of contemporary International Law, of the new jus gentium of the XXIst century. Although this is a recent development, its roots go back to the legal thinking of the beginning of the second half of the XXth century, or even earlier.
It may be recalled that the "conscience of mankind" received judicial recognition already in the the late forties, Alejandro Álvarez stated that the population (as a constitutive element of statehood) had at last entered into international life, and what mattered most was the identifi cation of the common interests of the international community as a whole; to the Chilean jurist, it was the international juridical conscience and the sentiment of justice that were to achieve the reconstruction of International Law.
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Th is line of thinking was to be retaken, in a systematized way, by C.W. 35 On his turn, in a visionary article published in 1950, M. Bourquin called for the attribution to the international community of the function of "guardian of objective law", above all in face of the threat of a "massifi ed" civilization. Th e State itself acted -distinctly from the traditional conception -not solely in the pursuance of its own interest, but also as a member of such international community. Th e traditional voluntarist conception of International Law, "en faisant de la volonté de l'État la seule force génératrice du droit, (...) déforme le phénomène juridique; (...) elle oublie que le droit est inhérent a toute société, qu'il existe là-même où aucune organisation étatique ne participe à son élaboration".
36
Th e human problems which conform the contemporary international agenda have inevitably drawn increasing attention to the conditions of living of human beings everywhere, with a direct bearing in the construction of Law itself. Human beings were again to occupy a central place in the law of nations, -which led Bourquin to conclude that "ni au point de vue de son objet, ni même au point de vue de sa structure, le droit des gens ne peut se défi nir comme un droit inter-étatique". Two decades later, in face of the developments in the law of outer space, there was support in expert writing for the view that the comunitas humani generis (which refl ected the "moral unity of the human kind" in the line of the thinking of Francisco de Vitoria) already presented a juridical profi le, rendering "humanity" itself a "subject of Law", because "its existence as a moral and political unity" is an idea which "is progressively becoming reality with all the juridical implications that it entails".
38 Ever since, this line of thinking has been attracting growing attention, at least on the part of the more lucid doctrine. To S. Sucharitkul, e.g., there is no reason to impede humanity to be subject of International Law, it being possible to that eff ect to be represented by the international community itself; this is a conception which is to prevail, through the humanization of international law, so as "to strengthen the juridical statute of the human being as subject of law" and to save humanity from an "imminent disaster" (the nuclear threat).
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In the lucid observation of Nagendra Singh, the fact that, as time went on, concepts and norms of International Law have attained universal acceptance (in such domains as International Humanitarian Law, the law of treaties, diplomatic and consular law), independently of the multicultural composition of the international community, reveals the evolution of International Law towards universalization. 40 Th e need to research into the status conscientiae of the States was stressed by R. Quadri, who insisted on the international juridical conscience as the material source of the international legal order wherein pluralism prevailed.
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In Italian international legal doctrine, addressing the "unity of the juridical world", a warning is found to the eff ect that Th e rights of humanity transcend, by defi nition, reciprocity, proper of relations at the purely inter-State level.
43 It has been contended that the international community should guide itself in the sense of restructuring the international system so as to secure the survival and well-being of humankind as a whole.
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Th e ILC, while elaborating its Draft Code of Off ences against the Peace and Security of Mankind, advanced the understanding (in 1986) that it was possible to conceive a crime against humanity "in the threefold sense of cruelty directed against human existence, the degradation of human dignity and the destruction of human culture". Th e individual being a guardian of basic ethical values and a custodian of human dignity, an attack that he suff ered could amount to a crime against humanity to the extent that such attack came to shock "human conscience"; one could thus fi nd, -in the outlook of the ILC, -a "natural link" between the human kind and the individual, one being "the expression of the other", what led to the conclusion that the term "humanity" (in the expression "crime against humanity") meant the human kind as a whole and "in its various individual and collective manifestations".
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In fact, already in the beginnings of International Law, recourse was made to "fundamental notions of humanity" which governed the conduct of States. What subsequently was denominated "crimes against humanity" emanated, originally, from customary International Law, 46 to develop conceptually, later on, in the ambit of International Humanitarian Law, 47 and, more recently, in that of International Criminal Law. 48 Crimes against humanity are today tipifi ed in the Rome Statute of the permanent International Criminal Court (Article 7). 49 We Humankind as a Subject of International Law framework encompassing present and future generations, presents the double advantage of not neglecting the time factor 56 and not isolating one generation from the others. Th is would lead to the diffi culty, already detected in expert writing, of asserting rights of future generations, which do not yet exist and may be rather remote in time; yet, it is quite conceivable to establish, among the living, legal representation on behalf of humankind, comprising its present and future segments.
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Th e overriding principle of human solidarity holds the living, the present generation, accountable to the unborn (future generations, for the stewardship of the common heritage or concern of humankind, so as not to leave to those who are still to come the world in a worse condition than it found it. After all, "We all live in time. Th e passing of time aff ects our juridical condition. Th e passing of time should strengthen the bonds of solidarity which link the living to their dead, bringing them closer together. Th e passing of time should strengthen the ties of solidarity which unite all human beings, young and old, who experience a greater or lesser degree of vulnerability in diff erent moments along their existence. (...) In a general way, it is at the beginning and the end of the existential time that one experiences greater vulnerability, in face of the proximity of the unknown (...)".
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We are here still in the fi rst steps, and there remains of course a long way to go in order to attain a more perfected and improved system of legal representation of humankind in International Law, so that the rights recognized to it thus far can be properly vindicated on a widespread basis. In my understanding, the present limitations of the capacity to act on behalf of humankind itself at international level in no way aff ect its emerging legal personality, its condition of subject of International Law. As I saw it fi t to state in my Concurring Opinion in the Advisory Opinion n. 17 of the IACtHR, on the Juridical Condition and Human Rights of the Child (2002), the international juridical personality of all human beings remains intact, irrespective of the existential condition 59 or limitations of the juridical capacity to exercise their rights for themselves; what ultimately matters is that they all have the right to a legal order (at domestic as well as international levels) which eff ectively protects the rights inherent to them (paragraph 71). And this applies to all human beings as well as to humankind as a whole. In any case, the modest and slow advances so far achieved towards a regime of legal representation of humankind, -which are bound to progress in the years to come, -added to the recognition of its condition as subject of International Law, constitute yet another manifestation of the current process of humanization of Public International Law. Th e original conception of totus orbis of Francisco de Vitoria in the XVIth century has ever since paved the way for the formation and crystallization of the notions of an international community as a whole and of a true universal International Law, 60 having humankind as such among its subjects. Th at conception can and should be revived in our troubled times, in the context of the circumstances of the contemporary international scenario, if we really wish to leave a better world to our descendants. 61 In my view, we have already entered into the terra nova of the new jus gentium of the early XXIst century, the International Law for humankind.
